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Action observation training and motor imagery training have independently been studied
and considered as an effective training strategy for improving motor skill learning.
However, comparative studies of the two training strategies are relatively few. The
purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of action observation training
and motor imagery training on the development of mental representation structure
and golf putting performance as well as the relation between the changes in mental
representation structure and skill performance during the early learning stage. Forty
novices were randomly assigned to one of four groups: action observation training,
motor imagery training, physical practice and no practice. The mental representation
structure and putting performance were measured before and after 3 days of training,
then after a 2-day retention period. The results showed that mental representation
structure and the accuracy of the putting performance were improved over time through
the two types of cognitive training (i.e., action observation training and motor imagery
training). In addition, we found a significant positive correlation between changes in
mental representation structure and skill performance for the action observation training
group only. Taken together, these results suggest that both cognitive adaptations and
skill improvement occur through the training of the two simulation states of action, and
that perceptual-cognitive changes are associated with the change of skill performance
for action observation training.
Keywords: motor learning, cognitive training, skill acquisition, golf putting, SDA-M, simulation theory
INTRODUCTION
Motor learning means a relatively permanent change in the competence of skill performance,
resulting from systematic and repeated practice (e.g., Magill, 2000). The learning of a motor
skill is commonly attained via physical repetition of a skill before moving to a different
motor skill (e.g., Coker, 2004). However, research has shown that cognitive training, such as
motor imagery and action observation training, can also be applied effectively to facilitate
skill learning, either alone, or combined with physical practice (e.g., Hodges and Williams, 2012).
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Motor imagery refers to a dynamic state during which
learners simulate specific motor actions mentally, without actual
movement (e.g., Jeannerod, 1995; Decety, 1996). Furthermore,
motor imagery training has been used as an effective means to
facilitate motor learning and performance (e.g., Driskell et al.,
1994; Murphy, 1994; Schack et al., 2014). Meta-analyses on this
topic have reported that motor imagery training has a positive
effect on motor performance, even though the degree of its
effectiveness varies with the moderators, such as type of task,
experience level of participants, duration of practice, and other
factors (e.g., Driskell et al., 1994). In addition, motor imagery
training was shown to be more effective compared to no practice,
but was less effective than physical practice. Moreover, the
combination has been proven to be as effective, or even more
effective, than either motor imagery or physical practice alone
(e.g., Hall et al., 1992; Liu et al., 2014; Bajaj et al., 2015). Thus,
these findings show that motor imagery training can be an
effective type of cognitive training as a complement to physical
practice to enhance motor outcomes.
Action observation is an effective means of observational
practice that has been considered extensively for enhancing
motor learning and performance (e.g., Ste-Marie et al., 2012),
as well as for modifying social behavior (e.g., Bandura, 1986).
Research on action observation showed that action observation
training benefits not only performance production variables like
movement coordination pattern (e.g., Horn et al., 2007), but
also performance outcome variables related to motor learning
(e.g., Hayes et al., 2008). To assess the motor learning effect of
action observation training, previous studies compared the effect
of action observation training with the effect of physical practice
or no practice. From this, action observation training was found
to be superior to no practice (e.g., Kohl and Shea, 1992; Hayes
et al., 2008). In addition, it was suggested that the combination of
action observation training and physical practice provides more
unique opportunities than either action observation or physical
practice alone (e.g., Shea et al., 2000;Weeks andAnderson, 2000).
These findings show that action observation training can be an
effective type of cognitive training as a complement to physical
practice to facilitate behavior outcomes.
Jeannerod (2001) has proposed that simulation states
(S states) such as action observation and motor imagery are
functionally equivalent to action execution, assuming that both
are based on action representations encoded in the brain. This
proposal has been supported bymany brain-image studies, which
showed that both action observation and motor imagery lead
to the activation of motor-related brain areas (e.g., Lotze et al.,
1999; Filimon et al., 2007; Lorey et al., 2013). These studies
suggested that, to some extent, they make use of the same
neural substrates as those involved during the execution of
observed or imagined actions. Furthermore, many studies have
reported that the neural representations for action observation
and motor imagery are somewhat similar to those for motor
execution (e.g., Clark et al., 2004; Filimon et al., 2007; Zabicki
et al., 2017). For action observation, motor-related information,
which is available through the visual system, is encoded into
a type of mental representation in long-term memory for
the organization of a future intended action (e.g., Holmes
and Calmels, 2008; Ste-Marie et al., 2012). Motor imagery is
required to consciously retrieve a stored mental representation
in long-term memory (e.g., Jeannerod and Decety, 1995;
Bandura, 1997; Soohoo et al., 2001; Wright et al., 2014). These
indicate that mental representations, which play a key role in
the control and organization of intended actions (e.g., Land
et al., 2013), are involved during action observation and motor
imagery.
Although motor imagery and action observation rely on
a similar action representation, there is a difference between
them in aspects of the mechanism of cognitive process.
Motor imagery is a knowledge-driven cognitive process that is
internally simulated based on information in long-termmemory,
without an external stimulus (e.g., Murphy, 1994; Soohoo
et al., 2001; Holmes and Calmels, 2008; Helm et al., 2015).
Instead, action observation is a percept-driven cognitive process
that is externally guided by an external stimulus, such as a
live demonstration or recorded video (e.g., Ram et al., 2007;
Holmes and Calmels, 2008; Vogt et al., 2013). Therefore, motor
imagery completely relies on mental representations stored in
long-term memory to generate a motor image (e.g., Farah,
1984; Mulder et al., 2004; Frank et al., 2014; Schack et al.,
2014). On the contrary, action observation is not dependent
on the mental representation in long-term memory, since it
completes a percept-driven process (e.g., Guillot and Collet,
2010; Wright et al., 2014); that is, visual information provided
externally is held in working memory, and does not necessarily
rely on representations stored in long-term memory. This
implies that, despite the functional equivalence between action
observation and motor imagery, the two simulation states
(S-states) of action may not necessarily lead to the same
effect in the improvement of the mental representation and
performance.
The perceptual-cognitive perspective specifies that cognitive
representations, which guide motor actions, are formed based
on perceptual information (Zentgraf et al., 2009). In this sense,
the perceptual-cognitive perspective on motor control addresses
the idea that intended and executed motor actions are based on
the mental representation of motor actions stored in long-term
memory (e.g., Mechsner et al., 2001; Schack and Mechsner,
2006). From the cognitive action architecture approach (CAA-A;
Schack, 2004; for reviews see e.g., Land et al., 2013), the
organization of motor action for the execution is functionally
guided bymental representations encoded in long-termmemory.
In other words, mental representations function as a cognitive
reference for movement control. The framework of mental
representation is composed of basic action concepts (BACs),
which are identified as major representation units for complex
actions (e.g., Schack, 2004; Schack and Mechsner, 2006). Based
on the CAA-A, functional changes in the relation of BACs appear
over the motor learning process within a conceptual framework
in long-termmemory (e.g., Bläsing et al., 2009; Schack and Ritter,
2009; Frank et al., 2013).
To investigate the role of mental representations in long-term
memory, Schack and Mechsner (2006) compared the difference
in mental representation structure according to different skill
levels, employing the structural dimensional analysis of mental
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representation (SDA-M; for more details see Schack, 2012).
According to the results, mental representation structures of
high-level experts were not only well organized, but also
corresponded to functional demands of the task. In contrast,
mental representation structures of low-level players and novices
were relatively less organized and less linked to the functional
demands of the task. Similar results were also reported in some
studies that examined the difference in mental representation
structure with skill expertise using the SDA-M for diverse
motor tasks (e.g., Schack and Hackfort, 2007; Bläsing et al.,
2009; Velentzas et al., 2010). In addition, according to Frank
et al. (2013), the mental representation structure of golf novices
became functionally more organized with physical practice over
time, whereas no practice did not cause any changes in mental
representation structure. These findings suggest that mental
representations serve as a basis for action control, adapting
functionally over the course of motor learning.
Given that most motor skills include both physical and
cognitive elements, not only physical practice but also cognitive
training may lead to the development of mental representation.
Recently, Frank et al. (2014) examined the effect of motor
imagery training on mental representation structure and
performance of novice golf players. The study showed that
mental representation structure was functionally well organized
particularly following motor imagery training. Moreover, in
a recent study by Frank et al. (under review), it was
shown that action observation training for golf beginners
led to more functional mental representation structures along
with performance improvement. These findings suggest that
both motor imagery training and action observation training
can enhance the functional adaption of task-specific mental
representation in the early learning stage.
Taken together, motor imagery training and action
observation training in themselves have a positive effect on
the improvement of skill performance of novice learners in
the early skill acquisition stage. Some studies have compared
the differences in neurophysiologic and behavioral effects
between motor imagery training and action observation training.
Nevertheless, to date, no studies have compared how motor
imagery and action observation training affect the formation
process of mental representation in novices. Thus, in this
study, we aimed at investigating the differences in the effects
of the two types of cognitive training on the development
of mental representation structure and the performance of a
golf putting task. It was expected that motor imagery training
and action observation training, as well as physical practice,
would lead to functional changes of mental representation
structure, along with performance improvement, compared to
no practice (i.e., control group). Furthermore, it was expected
that action observation training would be relatively more
effective than motor imagery training in the development of
mental representation, since it was predicted that novices have
available limited representation structure of the golf putt in their
long-term memory. Therefore, we expected that the allocation
of new and well-structured motor information through action
observation would lead to more elaborate representation and
better performance than the simulation through motor imagery.
In addition, based on the CAA-A, it was expected that the
structured change of mental representation would be somewhat
linked to performance improvement.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty participants from local university (18 males, 22 females;
Mage = 25.20, SD = 4.12) took part in this study. All participants
were beginners with no prior experience in golf, and had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. They were randomly assigned
into four groups, maintaining an equal group size: action
observation training group (n = 10, Mage = 23.30, SD = 3.40,
4 males), motor imagery training group (n = 10, Mage = 26.50,
SD = 3.87, 4 males), physical practice group (n = 10,Mage = 26.30,
SD = 4.79, 4 males), and control group with no practice (n = 10,
Mage = 24.70, SD = 4.06, 6 males). This study was carried out in
accordance with the recommendations of the ethics committee of
the University of Bielefeld (EUB) with written informed consent
from all subjects. All subjects gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was




The SDA-M was used to evaluate the mental representation
structure (e.g., Schack, 2012) of the golf putt. This method
provides psychometric information on the structure of
movement representation in long-term memory. More
specifically, it is possible to investigate the status of the
clustering and relations regarding BACs of a motor action
through SDA-M. Thus, SDA-M has been employed as a reliable
method to measure the mental representation structure of motor
action (e.g., Schack and Mechsner, 2006; Bläsing et al., 2009;
Frank et al., 2013). The following 16 BACs for golf putting that
were developed by Frank et al. (2013) were applied in this study
TABLE 1 | Basic action concepts of the golf putt.
Movement phase Number Basic action concept (BAC)
Preparation 1 Shoulders parallel to target line
2 Align club face square to target line
3 Grip check
4 Look to the hole
Backswing 5 Rotate shoulders away from the ball
6 Keep arms-shoulder triangle
7 Smooth transition
Forward swing 8 Rotate shoulders towards the ball
9 Accelerate club
10 Impact with the ball
11 Club face square to target line at impact
Attenuation 12 Follow-through
13 Rotate shoulders through the ball
14 Decelerate club
15 Direct clubhead to planned position
16 Look to the outcome
Note: Each movement phase contains basic action concepts that are functionally
related to one another.
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(see Table 1). From a functional and biomechanical perspective,
each of the 16 BACs can be allocated to one of four movement
phases: BAC 1–4 (preparation phase), BAC 5–7 (backswing
phase), BAC 8–11 (forward swing phase), and BAC 12–16
(attenuation phase).
To measure mental representation structure, a splitting task
was conducted (step 1 of the SDA-M). It aimed to acquire the
data on the representational distance among the 16 cognitive
units (16 BACs) for golf putting. Participants were instructed to
judge whether an anchor concept and a concept were functionally
related to each other during the execution of the movement.
Each of 16 BACs was presented as an anchor concept, whereas
the remaining 15 BACs were provided, one by one in a random
order, to be compared with the anchor concept. The anchor
concept was not changed to a different concept until it was
compared to each of the remaining 15 BACs. Once one process
for an anchor concept was finished, another BAC was changed to
the role as an anchor. This procedure was performed for each of
16 BACs (for more details see Schack, 2012).
Skill Performance
All participants were asked to perform a golf putt toward a golf
hole (10.8 cm in diameter) projected by a beam at a distance
of 3 m from the starting point on a synthetic putting green
(length = 9 m, width = 4 m). Specifically, participants were
required to putt a golf ball as close as possible to the target.
To assess the accuracy of the performance, the two-dimensional
position coordinate, of where the ball stopped after each golf putt
trial, was recorded with six T10 CCD cameras (Vicon Motion
Systems Ltd., Oxford, UK). Based on the collected data, the mean
radial error (MRE) was calculated, which reflected the accuracy
of the performance (e.g., Hancock et al., 1995).
Imagery Ability
The revised version of the Movement Imagery Questionnaire
(MIQ-R; Hall and Martin, 1997) was used for the measurement
of visual and kinesthetic imagery ability. The MIQ-R was
composed of eight items: four items for visual imagery
and four items for kinesthetic imagery. Participants were
asked to execute a movement that was specified in each
item. Then, participants were instructed to imagine the
same movement that they had executed either visually or
kinesthetically, without performing any actual movement. Next,
they were required to rate how easy or difficult it was
to imagine the movement on a seven-point Likert scale,
ranging from 1 (very difficult to see or feel) to 7 (very easy
to see or feel). The MIQ-R was found to have adequate
internal reliability coefficients (0.84 for visual imagery subscales
and 0.88 for kinesthetic imagery subscales) and sufficient
test-retest reliability coefficients (0.80 for visual imagery
subscales and 0.88 for kinesthetic imagery subscales; Monsma
et al., 2009).
Post-Experimental Questionnaire
The participants of the action observation training and
motor imagery training groups were asked to complete a
post-experimental questionnaire immediately after the practice
session of each day, which aimed to examine how easily
they observed or imagined a movement. More specifically, the
participants of the observation training group were required to
indicate, on a seven-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = ‘‘very
difficult’’ to 7 = ‘‘very easy’’, how easy it was to observe
in accordance with the instruction. The participants of the
motor imagery training group were also asked to rate based
on a seven-point Likert scale. The scale ranged from ‘‘very
difficult’’ at 1 to ‘‘very easy’’ at 7, which indicated how easy
or difficult it was to imagine the movement according to the
instruction.
Procedure
This study was composed of a pre-test, 3 days of an experimental
treatment, a post-test, and a retention test (see Table 2).
Pre-Test
All participants participated individually in this experiment. A
pre-test was carried out before beginning the experiment to
evaluate the initial state of the mental representation structure
and putting performance. Specifically, participants were asked
to read and sign an informed consent form. Then, they were
provided with an explanation regarding the splitting task and
the meaning of each of 16 BACs of the putt. The splitting task
was conducted to measure mental representation structure. After
that, participants were required to perform two practice trials
of golf putting followed by 15 test trials and try to putt the ball
as close as possible to the target. After testing, participants were
asked to complete the MIQ-R (Hall and Martin, 1997).
Experimental Treatment
Participants in experimental groups took part in a training
program for 3 days, and performed 60 trials per day. In contrast,
participants in the control group did not receive any training.
TABLE 2 | Experimental procedure by group and time period.
Pre-test Treatment Post-test Retention test
Group Day 1 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 3 Day 5
Action observation training group (n = 10) SDA-M + Putting task Observation training 60 times per day SDA-M + Putting task SDA-M + Putting task
Motor imagery training group (n = 10) SDA-M + Putting task Imagery training 60 times per day SDA-M + Putting task SDA-M + Putting task
Physical practice group (n = 10) SDA-M + Putting task Physical practice 60 times per day SDA-M + Putting task SDA-M + Putting task
No practice group (n = 10) SDA-M + Putting task No practice SDA-M + Putting task SDA-M + Putting task
Note: SDA-M (structural dimensional analysis of mental representation): the psychometric method for measuring the mental representation structure of golf putting; putting
task: 15 putting trials after two warm-up trials.
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Action observation training group
Participants in the action observation training group performed
60 observational trials on each day of the practice phase.
More specifically, they were requested to observe a video of
a putting scene that showed putts completed by an expert
golfer. The video was displayed with a first-person viewpoint
of the expert model. A screen (1.5 × 1.5 m) was located
in front of each participant. Participants were instructed to
make a putting posture, and grasp the putter on the green
as if they were actually performing the putting. Then, they
were required to observe the putting scene as attentively as
possible without actually performing it. There was a small
break each time 20 observational trials were completed. The
observational training was followed by the completion of a
post-experimental questionnaire on how easily they observed the
movement.
Motor imagery training group
Participants in the motor imagery training group conducted
60 mental trials on each day of the practice phase. Specifically,
they were asked to imagine the full putting scene from the
starting position on the green until the ball stopped on the
target, without actually performing the putt, however. Their
main task was to imagine the putting scene as clearly and
vividly as possible, and for it to feel as real as possible,
from their internal perspective. Participants were instructed
to make a putting posture by grasping the putter on the
green as if they were actually performing the putting. Then,
they were required to imagine, with their eyes closed and at
their own pace, that they raised one of their five fingers each
time they completed the imagery of one putt. There was a
small break after each time the imagery was performed 20
times. Following the mental training, participates completed
a post-experimental questionnaire regarding how easily they
imagined the movement.
Physical practice group
Participants in the physical practice group performed 60 physical
trials for the putt on each day of the practice phase.
Specifically, they were requested to putt the ball toward the
positioned target that was 3 m away from starting point,
in such a way that the ball rolled and then stopped as
close to the target as possible. The putting practice was
conducted at their own pace, and there was a short break each
time the putting was performed 20 times. No feedback was
provided, except for the immediate visible outcome of each
putt.
Control group
Participants assigned to the control group did not participate in
any training for 3 days of training period.
Post-Test and Retention Test
The post- and retention tests were administered the day after the
end of the experiment, and 2 days after the post-test, respectively.
The experimental protocol and the itemsmeasuredwere identical




A one-way ANOVA was used independently for the kinesthetic
imagery score, visual imagery score, and the combined score to
examine whether there was a difference in imagery ability for
basic body movements among the four groups.
Post-Experimental Questionnaire
ANOVA was used to compare the action observation training
and the motor imagery training groups’ results of the
post-experimental questionnaire, which was performed during
the 3 days of each treatment. Two-way ANVOAs (two cognitive
training groups × three practice days) with repeated measures
on the last factor were conducted to compare the difference
between the ease of action observation and motor imagery. The
significance level for data analysis was set at 5%.
Mental Representation Structure
Cluster analysis was conducted based on the data extracted
from the splitting task, which aimed to assess not only how
many significant clusters there were in the mean dendrogram
by group and test session, but also how well-structured their
relations were (e.g., Schack, 2012). The significance level for
cluster analysis was set at 5%, which corresponded to a critical
value of 3.41 (i.e., dcrit = 3.41). The critical value (dcrit)
was displayed as the horizontal line on the dendrogram. The
clusters below the line were considered statistically significant.
Then, statistical analysis of invariance was performed to
examine statistical differences in mental representation structure
according to group and test session (e.g., Schack, 2012; Frank
et al., 2013). For invariance analysis, a critical value was
λ = 0.68. A value equal to or more than 0.68 (i.e., λ ≥ 0.68)
indicated that there was no difference (two cluster solutions
were invariant), while a value less than 0.68 (i.e., λ < 0.68)
indicated that there was change (two cluster solutions were
variant). In addition, the Adjusted Rand Index (ARI; e.g., Santos
and Embrechts, 2009) was calculated to evaluate the degree
of similarity between a group dendrogram and a reference
dendrogram, reflecting well the four phases of the golf putt
(e.g., Frank et al., 2013). The value of ARI ranged from ‘‘−1’’
to ‘‘1’’. The value ‘‘−1’’ or ‘‘1’’ indicated ‘‘completely different’’
or ‘‘completely same’’ in terms of the degree of similarity,
respectively.
Skill Performance
MREwas calculated based on two-dimension coordinates of each
putting trial, which reflected the accuracy of putting performance
(e.g., Hancock et al., 1995). The calculated variable was analyzed
by two-way ANOVAs (four groups× three test sessions) with the
repeated measures on the last factor. In addition, further analysis
was conducted with a one-way ANOVA to investigate differences
between test sessions by group, and vice versa. The significance
level for all analyses was set at 5%.
Correlation
A two-tailed Pearson’s correlation coefficient analysis was
performed to investigate the relationship between the change
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of mental representation structure over time (i.e., from pre-,
to post-, and to retention test) and the change of skill
performance over time. Adjusted rand index, which reflects
the similarity between each individual’s mental structure and
the expert reference mental structure, and mean radial error,
which reflects the accuracy of skill performance, were used for the
analysis of the correlation. The significance level for all analyses
was set at 5%.
RESULTS
Imagery Ability
The assessment result for general imagery ability showed that
there was no main effect of group for the visual imagery
score, F(3,36) = 0.389, p = 0.762, η2p = 0.031, the kinesthetic
imagery score, F(3,36) = 0.366, p = 0.778, η2p = 0.030, and the
combined score, F(3,36) = 0.157, p = 0.925, η2p = 0.013. This
meant that there was no difference among groups in imagery
ability before the experiment began. Furthermore, the mean
score for the three imagery variables was 5.80, 5.33 and 5.40,
respectively. Specifically, each group scored an average of five
points (i.e., somewhat easy to see or feel) or more, for visual,
kinesthetic, and overall imagery scores. This indicated that each
group had adequate imagery ability (e.g., Smith and Collins,
2004; Smith et al., 2008; Frank et al., 2014).
Post-Experimental Questionnaire
The analysis result for the ease of complying with the instruction
showed that the main effect of group, F(1,18) = 4.987, p = 0.038,
η2p = 0.217 and practice day, F(2,36) = 17.934, p = 0.000,
η2p = 0.499, was significant, respectively. However, it was revealed
that a significant interaction between group and practice day,
F(2,36) = 4.796, p = 0.014, η2p = 0.210, was also significant. For
the post hoc test, the difference between groups by practice day
(or vice versa) was analyzed. The result of the first post hoc test
showed that on the first and second practice day, the score of
the action observation training group was significantly higher
than the score of the motor imagery training group for the
ease of complying with the instruction (p = 0.020, p = 0.017).
However, it was revealed that there was no significant difference
between the two groups on the last practice day (p = 0.458). In
addition, the result of the second post hoc test showed that for
the action observation training group, the score of the second
practice day had significantly increased compared to the score of
the first practice day (p = 0.045), and such an increased score was
maintained on the last practice day (p = 0.157). In contrast, for
the motor imagery training group, it was shown that there was
no significant difference between the first and second practice
day (p = 0.153), whereas the score of the third practice day was
higher than the score of the first (p = 0.002) and second practice
day (p = 0.032).
Mental Representation Structure
Action Observation Training Group
The cluster analysis showed that the number of statistically
significant functional clusters had increased over the test sessions
FIGURE 1 | Mean dendrograms indicating mental representation structure of
action observation training group at (A) pre-test, (B) post-test and (C)
retention test. The horizontal line indicates the critical Euclidean distance. The
critical value of the Euclidean distance (dcrit) was 3.41 for an α level of 5%. The
basic action concepts (BACs) above this line are considered not related. The
underlined BACs below this line are considered functionally related to each
other.
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(see Figure 1). More specifically, the clusters were (BAC 1,
2, 6), (BAC 8, 13), (BAC 9, 12), (BAC 10, 11) at the pre-
test, (BAC 1, 2, 15), (BAC 3, 6), (BAC 10, 11) at the post-
test, and (BAC 1, 2, 3, 6, 15), (BAC 8, 9), (BAC 10, 11),
(BAC 12, 13) at the retention test. Furthermore, the invariance
analysis was conducted to determine whether there was a
statistically significant difference between the test sessions. The
invariance analysis indicated that there was an evident significant
difference between the pre- and post-tests (λ = 0.37), between
the post- and retention tests (λ = 0.42), and between the
pre- and retention tests (λ = 0.48). Lastly, to evaluate the
degree of similarity between the mean dendrogram of the action
observation training group and the reference dendrogram that
was composed of four phases (i.e., preparation BACs 1–4,
backswing BACs 5–7, forward swing BACs 8–11, and attenuation
BACs 12–16), the ARI was calculated. The ARI analysis revealed
that the similarity became higher over the test session, given that
the ARI value ranges from −1 (i.e., completely different) to +1
(i.e., completely same). Specifically, ARIpre = 0.05, ARIpost = 0.07,
and ARIretention = 0.10 were shown at pre-, post-, and retention
tests, respectively.
Motor Imagery Training Group
Similar to the result of the action observation training
group, the cluster analysis of the motor imagery training
group demonstrated that the number of statistically significant
functional clusters had increased over the test sessions (see
Figure 2). More particularly, the clusters were (BAC 2, 6, 15),
(BAC 4, 16), (BAC 7, 14), (BAC 8, 13) at the pre-test,
(BAC 1, 2, 11), (BAC 4, 16), (BAC 8, 9) at the post-test,
and (BAC 1, 6), (BAC 2, 3, 15), (BAC 7, 14), (BAC 8, 9),
(BAC 10, 11) at the retention test. In addition, the invariance
analysis showed that there was a significant difference between
the pre- and post-tests (λ = 0.33), between the post- and
retention tests (λ = 0.33), and between the pre- and retention
tests (λ = 0.30). Lastly, the ARI analysis showed that the
similarity between the mean dendrogram of the motor imagery
training group and the reference dendrogram increased over
the test sessions. Precisely, ARIpre = 0.01, ARIpost = 0.02, and
ARIretention = 0.04 were displayed at the pre-, post-, and retention
tests, respectively.
Physical Practice Group
The cluster analysis of the physical practice group revealed that
the increase in the number of significant functional clusters
was evident over the test session (see Figure 3). In further
detail, the clusters were (BAC 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 15), (BAC 10, 13)
at the pre-test, (BAC 1, 2, 3, 4, 6), (BAC 8, 9), (BAC 10, 11)
at the post-test, and (BAC 1, 6), (BAC 2, 3, 4, 15), (BAC
8, 9), (BAC 10, 11, 13) at the retention test. Moreover, the
invariance analysis demonstrated that there was a significant
difference between the pre- and post-tests (λ = 0.45), between
the post- and retention tests (λ = 0.45), and between the
pre- and retention tests (λ = 0.40). Lastly, the ARI analysis
showed that the mean dendrogram of the physical practice group
and the reference dendrogram became more similar over the
test sessions. Specifically, ARIpre = 0.08, ARIpost = 0.11, and
FIGURE 2 | Mean dendrograms indicating mental representation structure of
motor imagery training group at (A) pre-test, (B) post-test and (C) retention
test (α = 0.05; dcrit = 3.41).
ARIretention = 0.13 were shown at the pre-, post-, and retention
tests, respectively.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean dendrograms indicating mental representation structure of
physical practice group at (A) pre-test, (B) post-test and (C) retention test
(α = 0.05; dcrit = 3.41).
Control Group
The cluster analysis of the control group revealed that the
number of functional clusters had increased significantly over
FIGURE 4 | Mean dendrograms indicating mental representation structure of
control group at (A) pre-test, (B) post-test and (C) retention test (α = 0.05;
dcrit = 3.41).
the test sessions (see Figure 4). More specifically, the clusters
were (BAC 1, 2, 3, 6, 15) at the pre-test, (BAC 1, 2, 3, 6, 15),
(BAC 7, 14), (BAC 9, 10) at the post-test, and (BAC 1, 2, 3,
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FIGURE 5 | Mean radial error (MRE) across group and test session. MRE
reflects the accuracy of the putting performance. Error bars indicate standard
errors.
6, 15), (BAC 8, 9), (BAC 10, 11), (BAC 12, 14, 16) at the
retention test. Furthermore, the invariance analysis revealed that
there was a significant difference between the pre- and post-tests
(λ = 0.38), between the post- and retention tests (λ = 0.45), and
between the pre- and retention tests (λ = 0.42). Lastly, the ARI
analysis demonstrated that the mean dendrogram of the control
group became more similar to the reference dendrogram over
the test sessions. To be exact, ARIpre = 0.02, ARIpost = 0.03, and
ARIretention = 0.07 were revealed for the pre-, post-, and retention
tests, respectively.
Accuracy of Performance
The analysis of the accuracy of putting performance revealed
that the main effects of group, F(3,36) = 4.583, p = 0.008,
η2p = 0.276, and test session, F(2,72) = 24.744, p = 0.000, η2p = 0.407,
were significant, respectively (see Figure 5). The result of the
post hoc test on the main effect of group showed that the
physical practice group only performed significantly better than
the control group, p = 0.005, d = 1.25, and that no significant
differences were found among the AO training group, the MI
training group, and the control group. In addition, the result
of the post hoc test on the main effect of test session showed
that the performance of the post-test, p = 0.000, d = 1.03 and
the retention test, p = 0.000, d = 1.06, was significantly better
than the performance of the pre-test, respectively, and that
no significant difference was found between the post-test and
the retention test. Moreover, the result of the post hoc test on
the differences among test sessions by group showed that the
accuracy in the post-test of the AO training group, p = 0.037,
d = 0.96, the MI training group, p = 0.006, d = 1.50, and
the PP group, p = 0.005, d = 1.55, was significantly higher
than the accuracy of the pre-test, respectively, and that such an
improvement was maintained in the retention test. However,
the control group did not show significant differences among
the pre-test, the post-test, and the retention test, p = 0.266,
η2p = 0.137. In addition, the result of the post hoc test on the
FIGURE 6 | Pearson correlation between adjusted rand index and mean radial
error over test sessions across all training groups.
differences groups by test session showed that the accuracy of
the AO training group, p = 0.034, d = 0.97, and the PP group,
p = 0.000, d = 1.56, was significantly higher than the control
group in the post-test, and that the accuracy of the PP group,
p = 0.009, d = 1.26, was significantly better than the control
group in the retention test. For the pre-test, no significant
differences in the accuracy were found among groups, p = 0.587,
η2p = 0.052.
Correlation
For the training groups (i.e., action observation training, motor
imagery training and physical practice), the Pearson correlation
between ARI and MRE was significant, r = −0.307, n = 90,
p = 0.003 (see Figure 6). This indicates that the more elaborate
the representation as shown by higher rand indices, the better
the performance was as indicated by lower error scores. In
addition, the correlation analysis for the action observation
training group revealed that the Pearson correlation between
ARI and MRE was significant, r = −0.399, n = 30, p = 0.029
(see Figure 7). This also indicates that the relationship between
mental representation structure and skill performance is positive
for the action observation training group. However, for the
FIGURE 7 | Pearson correlation between adjusted rand index and mean radial
error over test sessions of the action observation training group.
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motor imagery training group, r = 0.010, n = 30, p = 0.956, the
physical practice group, r = −0.241, n = 30, p = 0.200, and the
control group, r = 0.135, n = 30, p = 0.477, the Pearson correlation
between the ARI and MRE was not significant.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the influence
of action observation training and motor imagery training
on the development of mental representation, as well as the
performance of motor skill. Specifically, this study was designed
to compare the effects of the two cognitive training interventions
for both mental representation structure and skill performance,
as well as to examine the relationship between the change
of mental representation structure and the change of skill
performance. In this respect, the present study is an extension of
previous research done by Kim et al. (2011), which have studied
the effect of action observation training and motor imagery
training on skill performance. It was hypothesized that action
observation training would bemore effective thanmotor imagery
training, both in the development of mental representation
structure and in the improvement of skill performance in
early stage of skill learning. Furthermore, it was expected
that the change in mental representation structure would be
connected with the change in skill performance. The results of
this study support the established hypothesis partially. To be
specific, we could find some meaningful improvement in mental
representation structure and skill performance over time through
both action observation training and motor imagery training.
In addition, it was found that changes in mental representation
structure and skill performance were positively correlated for the
action observation training group.
With regard to mental representation structure of golf
putting, it was revealed that the mental representation structures
of all practice groups (i.e., motor imagery, action observation and
physical practice) changed over time, leading to more elaborate
and structured representations in the direction of the expert
reference dendrogram, reflecting well the four movement phases
(i.e., BAC 1–4, BAC 5–7, BAC 8–11 and BAC 12–16; Frank
et al., 2013). This result indicates that practice brings about
functional changes of task-specific mental representation in
long-term memory, which is in line with results of recent studies
on perceptual-cognitive changes (Frank et al., 2013, 2014, 2016).
Related to this, studies focusing on the neurophysiological
mechanisms underlying motor imagery and action observation
have shown that the two simulation states of action share certain
neural representations (Conson et al., 2009; Holmes et al., 2010).
For instance, brain regions such as the primary and the premotor
cortex, the supplementary motor area, the cerebellum and the
basal ganglia tend to be activated not only during motor imagery,
but also during action observation in the absence of any overt
action (Lorey et al., 2013). In this respect, the changes in mental
representation structure in this study may be associated with
changes in brain activation that may in turn be correlated with
motor outcome. The extent to which each simulation state
contributes to changes in motor learning related brain areas,
however, has yet to be determined (Frank and Schack, 2017).
Interestingly, it was revealed that the initial status of the
mental representation structure differed somewhat between the
groups. Specifically, (ARIpre = 0.05, BAC 1, 2, 6; BAC 8, 13; BAC
9, 12; BAC 10, 11), (ARIpre = 0.01, BAC 2, 6, 15; BAC 4, 16;
BAC 7, 14; BAC 8, 13), (ARIpre = 0.08, BAC 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 15;
BAC 10, 13), and (ARIpre = 0.02, BAC 1, 2, 3, 6, 15) meaningful
clusters (of golf putting) were shown for the pre-test in action
observation training, motor imagery training, physical practice,
and control groups, in that order. Meaningful clusters represent a
group of BACs that are functionally or biomechanically related to
movement components and phases for the achievement of action
goals (Schack, 2012). Thus, this result indicates that even though
participants actually had no previous performance experience
with the task, the initial cognitive architecture of the mental
representation may have varied depending upon the individual,
suggesting that the initial dissimilarity of mental representation
structure may lead to different effects for the development of
mental representation and performance during the early motor
learning phase. However, as Frank et al. (2014) indicated in their
article, to date, it is not clear whether the slope of representation
development is functionally related to the initial status of
representation structure. The rate of change in representation
is likely to be different because there are various representation
structures in novices. Therefore, future studies should be
undertaken to investigate differences in the development of
mental representation and skill performance according to the
degree of novices’ initial representation structure for a better
understating of this issue.
Contrary to our expectation, the mental representation
structure of the control group developed over time as well.
Specifically, (BAC 1, 2, 3, 6, 15) at the pre-test (ARIpre = 0.02),
(BAC 1, 2, 3, 6, 15), (BAC 7, 14), (BAC 9, 10) at the post-test
(ARIpost = 0.03), and (BAC 1, 2, 3, 6, 15), (BAC 8, 9), (BAC
10, 11), (BAC 12, 14, 16) at the retention test (ARIretention = 0.07)
were found respectively. The possible explanation for this result
is that physical test trials executed during test sessions might
have influenced the development of the mental representation
structure.
With reference to the cognitive effect of the action observation
training and motor imagery training, it was expected that
action observation training, associated with a bottom-up
mechanism, would be more effective than motor imagery
training, associated with a top-down mechanism, in the
development of a mental representation structure for novices
in the early learning stage (see Holmes and Calmels, 2008
for details on potential mechanisms involved in observation
and imagery). However, we could not compare the difference
in mental representation structure objectively between the
two cognitive trainings, due to the difference between the
initial representation structures. Nevertheless, the result of
this study is meaningful in that task-specific representation
structure can be developed through practice, which is especially
relevant to the perceptual-cognitive perspective (Mechsner
et al., 2001), and the cognitive action architecture approach
(Schack, 2004), which emphasize the crucial role of mental
representation for the generation and control of voluntary
movements.
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Regarding the ease of the use of the two types of
cognitive trainings, the present result of the post-experimental
questionnaire showed that the use score of action observation
was significantly higher than that of motor imagery by the
second practice day, out of the 3 days in the practice period.
This result indicates that action observation was easier to use
than motor imagery for novices who had no previous task
experience. For example, Soohoo et al. (2001) compared the effect
of observation and imagery on the performance of a squat lift
skill. In their study, participants were instructed to choose and
use their preferred method of the two types of cognitive training
(i.e., action observation and motor imagery) for the fifth trial,
after they performed the fourth trial of either observation or
imagery in each predetermined group. The result of the study
demonstrated that many participants preferred to watch the
video of an expert model who performed the task. This result
shows that novices prefer action observation to motor imagery
during the early stage of skill learning. However, there are still
individual differences associated with preference. Therefore, in
future research, individual preference needs to be considered for
the assignment of cognitive training groups.
With regard to performance outcome, first, before the
practice phase, there was no difference in the accuracy among
the four groups. After 3 days of training, the three practice
groups (i.e., action observation training, motor imagery training,
and physical practice group), except for the control group,
significantly improved in accuracy at the post-test compared to
the pre-test. Moreover, such an improvement was maintained
at the retention test. This is in line with the research result of
Kim et al. (2011) that investigated the difference in learning
effect between action observation and motor imagery of golf
putting. Thus, this result pattern supports the previous findings
that not only physical practice, but also cognitive training such
as action observation training or motor imagery training, can
enhancemotor skill acquisition and learning (Driskell et al., 1994;
Wulf et al., 2005; Hayes et al., 2007; Schmidt and Lee, 2013). In
addition, as Frank et al. (2014) mentioned in their article, which
investigated functional links between motor memory and motor
imagery, the relative short length of practice may be one reason
for the lack of differences among the groups in the performance
of golf putting. Therefore, future research on this topic that
employs golf putt task needs to consider a longer practice period
to prevent possible confounds in statistic result.
Lastly, regarding the relationship between the change
of mental representation structure and the change of skill
performance, it was revealed that the change in mental
representation structure of the training groups was positively
related to the change in skill performance, with more
elaborate mental representation being linked to better skill
performance. This result indirectly supports the perceptual-
cognitive perspective, which emphasizes the role of mental
representation as a basis for the control of voluntary motor
movements (Mechsner et al., 2001; Schack and Mechsner, 2006).
Additionally, the positive relationship between the two variables
by group was found to be significant for only action observation
group. This result implies that the mental representation
elaborated through action observation training might be more
related to the execution of the motor system.
Taken together, the findings of this study provide insights into
perceptual-cognitive and performance changes in the process
of motor learning through cognitive training. This study is the
first to compare the effect of action observation training and
motor imagery training on both the development of mental
representation and skill performance. Moreover, it is noteworthy
that this study has demonstrated that the two simulation states of
action led to both cognitive adaptation and skill improvement,
and that action observation training resulted in the positive
relationship between cognitive-perceptual and performance
changes. However, the generalizability of these findings is subject
to certain limitations. For instance, although this study was
designed to compare action observation and motor imagery as
objectively as possible, it was difficult to control all of the factors
that can influence the effect of action observation and motor
imagery, such as the possibility of imagery during observation
or the initial representation status of participants. Thus, more
research is required to confirm the findings of the present
study. Regarding future research on action observation and
motor imagery, future research might investigate the perceptual-
cognitive and behavioral patterns of the combined training
(i.e., AO + MI training) over the course of learning or relearning
in motor skill learning and motor rehabilitation settings rather
than their independent use (Eaves et al., 2016).
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